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Abstract 
After some decades of relative oblivion, the interest in the optimality properties of 
monopolistic competition has recently re-emerged due to the availability of an appropriate 
and parsimonious framework to deal with firm heterogeneity. Within this framework we 
show that non-separable utility, variable demand elasticity and endogenous firm 
heterogeneity cause the market equilibrium to err in many ways, concerning the number of 
products, the size and the choice of producers, the overall size of the monopolistically 
competitive sector. More crucially with respect to the existing literature, we also show that 
the extent of the errors depends on the degree of firm heterogeneity. In particular, the 
inefficiency of the market equilibrium seems to be largest when selection among 
heterogeneous firms is needed most, that is, when there are relatively many firms with low 
productivity and relatively few firms with high productivity. 
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1 Introduction
Do monopolistically competitive industries yield an optimal level of product
diversity? As discussed by Neary (2004), this classic issue in industrial or-
ganization motivated the canonical formalization of the Chamberlinian model
(Chamberlin, 1933) as put forth by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
These propose reduced formmodels that "regard aggregate demands as if they
result from the maximisation of a utility function dened directly over the quan-
tities of goods, and the form of the utility function is intended to capture the
desire for variety" (Dixit, 2004, p.125).1 The classic issue can be itself split into
four questions concerning the optimality of the market outcome (Stiglitz, 1975):
Are there too few or too many products? Are the quantities of the products
too small or too large? Are the products supplied by the right set of rms, or
are there errorsin the choice of technique? Are monopolistically competitive
industries too large or too small with respect to the rest of the economy?
The Chamberlinian model makes four basic assumptions (Bishop, 1967;
Brakman and Heijdra, 2004): the number of sellers in a group of rms is suf-
ciently large so that each rm takes the behavior of other rms in the group
as given; the group is well dened and small relative to the economy; products
are physically similar but economically di¤erentiated so that buyers have pref-
erences for all types of products (love for variety); there is free entry. In this
setup, optimality rests on how the market mechanism deals with the crucial
tradeo¤ of e¢ ciency versus diversity(Kaldor, 1934).
As forcefully highlighted by Dixit and Stiglitz (1975), there are good reasons
to doubt that the market will generally strike the right balance due to the public
nature of diversity in the reduced form approach. As in these models the range
of products enters utility as a direct argument in addition to the quantities
consumed, the range itself becomes a public good whose social benet is not
fully reected in private incentives. In the words of Spence (1976, pp. 230-231):
"[T]here are conicting forces at work with respect to the number
or variety of products. Because of setup costs, revenues may fail to
cover the costs of a socially desirable product. As a result, some
products may be produced at a loss at an optimum. This is a force
tending towards too few products. On the other hand, there are
forces tending towards too many products. First, because rms hold
back output and keep price above marginal cost, they leave more
room for entry than would marginal cost pricing. Second, when
a rms enter with a new product, it adds its own consumer and
producer surplus to the total surplus, but it also cuts into the prots
of the existing rms. If the cross elasticities of demand are high, the
dominant e¤ect may be the second one. In this case entry does not
increase the size of the pie much; it just divides it into more pieces.
Thus, in the presence of high cross elasticities of demand, there is a
tendency toward too many products".
1Structuralmodels, instead, "give an explicit model of a consumers choice where diver-
sity plays a role; discrete choice from a collection of products di¤erentiated by location in a
characteristic space in the most common framework" (Dixit, 2004, p.125). See Anderson, de
Palma and Thisse (1992) for microfoundations of the representative-consumer reduced form
approach based on random-utility models of discrete choice.
2
As the issue of optimal product diversity does not admit a general settlement,
explicit models with a detailed formulation of demand are used to isolate and
analyze the four questions described above. The canonical choice is to model an
economy consisting of two sectors. The rst sector is monopolistically competi-
tive and is the focus of the analysis. The second sector is perfectly competitive
and represents the rest of the economy. Its purpose is to hold factor prices in
check and to create the slack needed to answer the question whether the mo-
nopolistically competitive sector is too small or too big. This way the market is
allowed to eventually misallocate resources not only within the monopolistically
competitive sector but also between this sector and the rest of the economy.
The best known insights of the canonical model concern the special case in
which the group utilitydened over di¤erentiated products is separable across
them, the demand of each product is CES and rms are homogeneous. In this
case, the model shows that the rst-best (unconstrained) optimum calls for
larger rms and more product variety than the market provides. From a nor-
mative perspective, however, this result is traditionally regarded of little prac-
tical relevance for policy intervention because implementing the unconstrained
optimum requires the use of lump-sum instruments that are hardly available in
reality. These are needed to subsidize the entry of rms that otherwise would
not cover their setup (entry) costs due to marginal cost pricing at the optimum.
A lot of attention has, therefore, been devoted to the constrainedoptimum in
which the monopolistically competitive sector is nancially self-su¢ cient. Under
this constraint, the market is shown to provide the optimal number of products,
the optimal size rms and hence the optimal size of the sector.
The robustness of these results has been investigated along several dimen-
sions, with particular attention devoted to the impact of variable demand elas-
ticity and rm heterogeneity. These extensions are already discussed by Stiglitz
(1975), Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), who show that, when the
elasticity of demand is allowed to vary, the market equilibrium ceases to be
constrained optimal. In particular, products are too many (too few) and are
supplied in too small (too large) quantities when the elasticity of product utility
is increasing (decreasing) in the quantity consumed. As for rm heterogeneity,
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) consider a variant of their model in which there are two
groups of di¤erentiated products that are perfect substitutes for each other with
each group having CES sub-utility. Both xed and marginal costs are allowed to
di¤er between the two groups but not within them. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) use
this variant to show that the determination of the set of products to be supplied
depends on a richer list of factors: xed and marginal costs, the elasticity of the
demand schedule, the level of the demand schedule and the cross-elasticities of
demand. As a result, constrained optimality eventually applies only to a zero-
measure set of parametrizations. A more exhaustive treatment of this issue can
be found in Spence (1976) while Stiglitz (1975) reaches similar conclusions in
a model of the capital market in which rms with heterogeneous costs issue
securities whose returns are imperfectly correlated with each other.
After some decades of relative oblivion, interest in the optimality properties
of monopolistic competition has recently re-emerged due to the heterogeneous
rms revolutionin international trade theory (Melitz and Redding, 2012). This
has been initiated by Melitz (2003), who shows that a Dixit-Stiglitz model with
CES demand, endogenous rm heterogeneity and xed export costs (but without
the homogeneous good sector) predicts new gains from trade liberalization
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through the selection of the most e¢ cient rms. Subsequent papers show that
a similar result holds when demand exhibits variable elasticity, though xed
export costs are not necessarily needed for the result to materialize in this case
(Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Behrens and Murata, 2012).2
The validity of these (among other) insights on international trade issues
when alternative specications of demands are allowed for is discussed by Zh-
elobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse (2012). Using a framework with variable
elasticity of substitution (VES), they show that CES is just a knife-edge case.
While this nding is reminiscent of the conclusions by Stiglitz (1975), Spence
(1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse
(2012) do not discuss its implications for optimum product variety as those early
contributors do. This is done, instead, by Dhingra and Morrow (2012) who fully
characterize the optimality properties of a general demand system derived from
separable group utility. Their normative analysis thus complements the posi-
tive analysis of Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse (2012), showing that,
in the absence of the homogeneous sector, the market outcome achieves the (un-
constrained) optimum under CES but not under VES. When a homogeneous
sector is instead introduced, Melitz and Redding (2012) show that CES leads
to constrained rather than unconstrained optimality due to the misallocation of
resources between sectors. In other words, with CES rm heterogeneity does
not change the welfare insights of the original Dixit-Stiglitz framework while
things change in the case of VES.
The present paper goes back to the full set of classic questions laid down
at the beginning of this introduction, with renewed emphasis on the question
whether in the market equilibrium the products are supplied by the right set
of rms. It does so in a Melitzian framework of endogenous rm heterogeneity
with variable demand elasticity. Its aim is twofold. It shows that, with variable
demand elasticity and endogenous rm heterogeneity, the market outcome errs
with respect to the number of products, the size and the choice of producers,
and the overall size of the monopolistically competitive sector. More crucially
with respect to the existing literature, it also shows that the extent of the errors
depends on the degree of rm heterogeneity.
None of the papers previously cited simultaneously addresses the four classic
questions on the optimality of monopolistic competition in a framework with
variable demand elasticity and endogenous rm heterogeneity. Moreover, none
of them provides a systematic quantitative analysis of the impact of di¤erent
degrees of rm heterogeneity on the extent of market ine¢ ciencies. The dis-
cussion in Spence (1976) is systematic but qualitative, while Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) conne themselves to the special scenario discussed above. Dhingra and
Morrow (2012) are closer to what the present paper tries to achieve but the
focus of their comparative statics is on the parametrization of demand rather
than on the parametrization of rm heterogeneity. In addition, not having the
homogeneous good sector prevents them from discussing between-sector mis-
allocation. Di¤erently, Stiglitz (1975) presents comparative statics results on
the heterogeneity parameters but his heterogeneity is not endogenous and his
approach, based on a utility dened over alternative portfolios of assets, is quite
distinct from the canonical model of monopolistic competition.
2See Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) as well as Melitz and Redding (2013)
for a discussion of the actual novelty of these ndings.
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Clearly, as pointed out by Stiglitz (1975) and others, without some appropri-
ate parametrization of the problem, it would be hard to cut any new ground on
the issues of interest. We rely on the specic parametrization of linear demand
introduced by Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) as applied to endogenous
rm heterogeneity by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). This parametrization is less
general than the VES systems studied by Dhingra and Morrow (2012) and Zh-
elobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and J. F. Thisse (2012) in terms of product utility
but allows for cross-product e¤ects that are absent in the former paper and
only touched upon in the latter. For ease of exposition, in the main text we also
focus on a specic but commonly used Pareto parametrization of rm hetero-
geneity, relegating the discussion of the validity of some key results in the case
of a generic continuous parametrization to the appendix. There we also present
the welfare analysis of the degenerate case in which rms are homogeneous as
discussed by Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) for the same demand system.
The rest of the paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 briey presents
the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Sections 3 and 4 respectively derive
and compare the market equilibrium and the (unconstrained) optimum. Section
5 investigates the impact of rm heterogeneity on the gap between the equilib-
rium and optimum outcomes. Section 6 discusses the constrained optimum.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), consider an economy populated by L
consumers, each endowed with one unit of labor. Preferences are dened over
a continuum of di¤erentiated varieties indexed i 2 
, and a homogeneous good
indexed 0. All consumers own the same initial endowment q0 of this good and
share the same utility function given by
U = qc0 + 
Z
i2

qci di 
1
2

Z
i2

(qci )
2
di  1
2

Z
i2

qci di
2
(1)
with positive demand parameters ,  and , the latter measuring the love for
varietyand the others measuring the preference for the di¤erentiated varieties
with respect to the homogeneous good. The initial endowment q0 of the homo-
geneous good is assumed to be large enough for its consumption to be strictly
positive at the market equilibrium and optimal solutions.
Labor is the only factor of production. It can be employed for the production
of the homogeneous good under perfect competition and constant returns to
scale with unit labor requirement equal to one. It can also be employed for the
production of the di¤erentiated varieties under monopolistic competition. The
technology requires a preliminary R&D e¤ort of f > 0 units of labor to design a
new variety and its production process, which is also characterized by constant
returns to scale. The R&D e¤ort leads to the design of a new variety with
certainty whereas the unit labor requirement c of the corresponding production
process is uncertain, being randomly drawn from a continuous distribution with
cumulative density
G(c) =

c
cM
k
, c 2 [0; cM ] (2)
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This corresponds to the empirically relevant case in which marginal produc-
tivity 1=c is Pareto distributed with shape parameter k  1 over the support
[1=cM ;1). Hence, as k rises, density is skewed towards the upper bound of the
support of G(c).3 The R&D e¤ort cannot be recovered and this gives rise to a
sunk setup (entry) cost.
3 Equilibrium and optimum
3.1 The market outcome
In the decentralized equilibrium consumers maximize utility under their budget
constraints, rms maximize prots given their technological constraints, and
markets clear. It is assumed that the labor market as well as the market of the
homogeneous good are perfectly competitive. This good is chosen as numeraire,
which then implies that the wage equals one. The market of di¤erentiated
varieties is, instead, monopolistically competitive with a one-to-one relation
between rms and varieties.
The rst order conditions for utility maximization give individual inverse
demand for variety i as
pi =   qci   Qc (3)
whenever qci > 0, with Q
c =
R
i2
 q
c
i di. Demand for consumed varieties can be
derived from (3) as
qi  Lqci =
L
N + 
  L

pi +
N
N + 
L

p; 8i 2 
 (4)
where the set 
 is the largest subset of 
 such that demand is positive, N
is the measure (number) of varieties in 
 and p = (1=N)
R
i2
 pidi is their
average price. Variety i belongs to this set when
pi  1
N + 
(+ N p)  pmax (5)
where pmax   represents the price at which demand for a variety is driven to
zero.4
When a variety is produced by a rm with unit labor requirement c, the
corresponding rst order conditions for prot maximization are satised by an
output level equal to
qm(c) =

L
2 (c
m   c) if c  cm = pmax =   LQm
0 if c > cm
(6)
where mlabels equilibrium variables and Qm =
R cm
0
qm(c)dG(c) is the total
supply of di¤erentiated varieties. Expression (6) denes a cuto¤rule for survival:
3While the analysis in the main text rests on the Pareto distribution, several results have
more general validity as discussed in Appendix A.
4Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show that rewriting the indirect utility function in terms of
average price and price variance reveals that it decreases with average prices p, but rises with
the variance of prices 2p (holding p constant), as consumers then re-optimize their purchases
by shifting expenditures towards lower priced varieties as well as the numeraire good. Note
also that the demand system exhibits love of variety: holding the distribution of prices
constant (namely holding the mean p and variance 2p of prices constant), utility rises with
product variety N .
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only entrants that are productive enough (c  cm) eventually produce. For them
the price that corresponds to the prot-maximizing output qm(c) is pm(c) =
(cm + c) =2, implying markup m(c) = pm(c)  c = (cm   c) =2 and maximized
prot
(c) =
L
4
(cm   c)2 (7)
Due to free entry and exit, in equilibrium expected prot is exactly o¤set by
the sunk entry cost Z cm
0
(c)dG(c) = f
Given (2) and (7), this free entry conditioncan be rewritten as
cm
cM
k
L (cm)
2
2(k + 1)(k + 2)
= f (8)
where, due to the law of large numbers, G(cm) = (cm=cM )
k is the ex ante
probability that an entrant will produce as well as the ex post share of entrants
that eventually produce while L (cm)2 =[2(k+1)(k+2)] is the ex ante expected
prot conditional on producing as well as the ex post average prot of producers.
Condition (8) can be solved for the unique equilibrium cuto¤ marginal cost
cm =
"
2(k + 1)(k + 2) (cM )
k
f
L
# 1
k+2
(9)
Finally, the number of producers can be determined as a function of cm by
observing that marginal rms with unit labor requirement c = cm make zero
prot, i.e. p(cm) = cm = pmax. Recalling (5), that implies the following zero
cuto¤ prot condition
cm =
1
Nm + 
(+ Nmpm) (10)
where, again due to the law of large numbers, pm is the ex ante expected price
conditional on producing as well as the ex post average price of producers: pm =R cm
0
p(c)dGm(c) with Gm(c) = G(c)=G(cm) = (c=cm)k. The zero cuto¤ prot
conditioncan then be solved to obtain the equilibrium number of producers
(and varieties) as a function of the equilibrium cuto¤ as
Nm =
2(k + 1)

  cm
cm
(11)
with the corresponding equilibrium number of entrants given byNmE = N
m=G(cm) =
Nm (cM=c
m)
k.
3.2 The optimal outcome
As the quasi-linearity of (1) implies transferable utility, social welfare may be
expressed as the sum of all consumersutilities. This implies that the rst best
(unconstrained) planner chooses the number of varieties and their output lev-
els so as to maximize the social welfare function given by individual utility (1)
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times the number of consumers L, subject to the resource constraint, the vari-
etiesproduction functions and the stochastic innovation production function
(i.e. the mechanism that determines each varietys unit labor requirement as a
random draw from G(c) after f units of labor have been allocated to R&D).
Specically, given (1), the planner chooses the number NE of R&D projects
and the output levels of associated varieties so as to maximize social welfare
W = qc0L+ NE
R cM
0
[qc(c)L] dG(c)  12 LNE
R cM
0
[qc(c)L]
2
dG(c)
  12 L

NE
R cM
0
[qc(c)L] dG(c)
2 (12)
with respect to qc0, q
c(c) and NE subject to the aggregate resource constraint
qc0L+ fNE +NE
Z cM
0
cqc(c)LdG(c) = L+ q0L (13)
stating that the supply of the homogeneous good (qc0L), the supply of di¤er-
entiated varieties (NE
R cM
0
cqc(c)LdG(c)) and the R&D investment (fNE) are
costrained by the amount of available resources (L+ q0L).
After substituting (13) into (12), the planners problem can be rewritten as
the maximization of
W = L+ q0L  fNE +NE
R cM
0
(  c) q(c)dG(c)
  12 LNE
R cM
0
[q(c)]
2
dG(c)  12 L

NE
R cM
0
q(c)dG(c)
2 (14)
with respect to q(c) and NE . The corresponding rst order conditions are then:
@W
@q(c) =
h
NE (  c)  LNEq(c)  L (NE)2
R cM
0
q(c)dG(c)
i
dG(c) = 0 8c
(15)
@W
@NE
=  f + R cM
0
(  c) q(c)dG(c)  12 L
R cM
0
[q(c)]
2
dG(c)
  LNE
R cM
0
q(c)dG(c)
2
= 0
(16)
Rearranging (15) shows that optimal output qo(c) has to satisfy
q(c) =
L

(  c)  

NE
Z cM
0
q(c)dG(c) =
L

(  c)  

Q
with Q  L R
i2
 q
c
i di = NE
R cM
0
q(c)dG(c), i.e.
qo(c) =

L
 (c
o   c) if c  co =   LQo
0 if c > co
(17)
where o labels rst best optimum variables and Qo = NoE
R cM
0
qo(c)dG(c) is
the optimum total supply of di¤erentiated varieties. Result (17) reveals that,
just like the market, also the planner follows a cuto¤ rule allowing only for the
production of varieties whose unit labor requirements are low enough: qo(c) 
0 only for c  co. We can thus dene the conditional distribution of unit
input requirements for varieties that the planner actually produces as Go(c) =
G(c)=G(co). The number No of those varieties thus satises No = G(co)NoE .
Expressions (17) and (3) can be used to show that the rst best output
levels would clear the market in the decentralized scenario only if each producer
priced at its own marginal cost. To see this, note that (3) implies q(c) =
8
[   p(c)]L=   Q=. Then, imposing q(c) = qo(c) = (co   c)L= and Q =
Qo = (  co)L= from (17) respectively on the left and on the right hand sides
of q(c) = [  p(c)]L=   Q= gives p(c) = c.
Integrating (15) gives
Qo =
No
 + No
L

(  co)
where co =
R co
0
cdGo(c). Substituting this result in co =    Qo=L from (17)
and solving for No gives a planners cuto¤ condition analogous to the market
zero cuto¤ prot condition(10)
No = NoEG(c
o) =
(k + 1)

  co
co
(18)
In order to nd a second condition analogous to the market free entry con-
dition (8), we can substitute the optimal quantities from (17) as well as the
optimal number of varieties (18) in the second condition in (16) to obtain
co
cM
k
L (co)
2
(k + 1)(k + 2)
= f (19)
so that the rst best cuto¤ marginal cost evaluates to
co =
"
(k + 1)(k + 2) (cM )
k
f
L
# 1
k+2
(20)
This then determines the rst best number of varieties through (18). To sum
up, (20) and (18) are the rst best planners analogues of expressions (9) and
(11) derived for the market equilibrium.
4 Equilibrium vs. optimum
There are two dimensions along which the e¢ ciency of the market outcome can
be evaluated: the number of varieties actually produced Nm and the (condi-
tional) cost distribution of the rms producing them as dictated by the cuto¤
cm. In turn, the cost distribution determines the e¢ ciency of the corresponding
distributions of rm sizes and prices.5
The tradeo¤s the rst best planner faces when rms are heterogeneous can
be highlighted by rewriting the rst best objective (12) in terms of means and
variances of the distribution G(c) as follows
W =

L+ q0L+NE
 
bq   12 Lbq2   12 LNEbq2   bcbq   f  hNE  12 Lb2q + bcqi
(21)
where bc = R cM
0
cdG(c) is the unconditional mean unit labor requirement, bq =R cM
0
q(c)dG(c) and b2q = nR cM0 [q(c)]2 dG(c)  bq2o are the unconditional mean
5Dhingra and Morrow (2012) provide a detailed discussion of these issues that emphasizes
the role of alternative parametrizations of demand when utility is separable. The bias in
market allocations by demand characteristics is summarized in their Table 2. If we also
assumed separability (by imposing  = 0), our demand system would be compatible with the
parametrizations classied in the upper right hand corner of that table.
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and variance of quantities, and bcq = R cM0 cq(c)dG(c)  bcbq	 is the convariance
between quantities and unit input requirements.6 The rst bracketed term on
the right hand side of (21) corresponds to the planners objective when marginal
costs are homogeneous. Here the tradeo¤s are in terms of: (a) average quantity
vs. average marginal cost; (b) number of varieties vs. xed costs. The second
bracketed term has to be considered when unit labor requirements are hetero-
geneous. It shows that, due to love of variety, consumers dislike a consumption
bundle in which the quantity consumed varies across varieties. Formally, they
dislike a consumption bundle with large deviations from the average (large bq),
the more so the stronger the love of variety (larger ). On the other hand, there
is a penalty in o¤ering a basket of varieties with small deviations around the
average as higher productivity could be achieved by assigning little production
to varieties with high marginal costs (bcq < 0).
4.1 Selection
Comparing the equilibrium cuto¤with the optimal one is straightforward. Specif-
ically, comparing expressions (9) with (20) reveals that cm = 21=(k+2)co, which
implies co < cm. Accordingly, varieties with c 2 [co; cm] should not be supplied.
We thus have:
Proposition 1 (Selection) Firm selection in the market equilibrium is weaker
than optimal.
The intuition behind this proposition can be gauged by recalling that, as
discussed in Section 3.1, in the market equilibrium the markup of a rm with
marginal cost c equals m(c) = pm(c)  c = (cm   c) =2. Accordingly, consump-
tion is ine¢ ciently biased against the di¤erentiated varieties and in favor of the
numeraire good as the prices of the former are ine¢ ciently high.
Di¤erences in the strength of selection map into aggregate performance.
In particular, dening aggregate productivity  as average output per worker
weighted by rm size, expressions (2), (6) and (17) imply
j 
R cj
0
q(c)dG(c)R cj
0
cq(c)dG(c)
=
k + 2
k
1
cj
with j 2 fm; og Hence, the cuto¤ ranking co < cm maps into the productivity
ranking o > m, with o = 21=(k+2) m, giving rise to the following result:
Corollary 2 (Average productivity) Aggregate productivity in the market
equilibrium is lower than optimal.
4.2 Firm size
Proposition 1 has also implications in terms of optimality of the rm size dis-
tribution. To see this, one can use (6) and (17) to rewrite output levels as
qm(c) =
L
2
(cm   c) and qo(c) = L

(co   c)
6With homogeneous unit labor requirements we would have bq = bcq = 0 and the planners
objective boils down to the one in Ottaviano and Thisse (1999). See Appendix B for further
details.
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Since cm = 21=(k+2)co implies co < cm, it is readily seen that qm(c) > qo(c)
if and only if c >
 
2  21=(k+2) co, which falls in the relevant interval [0; co]
given that 0 <
 
2  3p2 <  2  21=(k+2) < 1. Hence, with respect to the
optimum, the market equilibrium undersupplies varieties with marginal cost
c 2 [0;  2  21=(k+2) co) and oversupplies varieties with marginal cost c 2
(
 
2  21=(k+2) co; cm]. Hence, we have:
Corollary 3 (Within-sector misallocation) The market equilibrium over-
supplies high cost varieties and undersupplies low cost ones with respect to the
optimum.
In other words, misallocation materializes as a lack of market concentration:
in the market equilibrium there are relatively too many small rms and relatively
too few large rms with respect to the optimum. The intuition behind this
corollary can be explained as follows. The markup m(c) = (cm   c) =2 is a
decreasing function of c. This implies that more productive rms do not pass
on their entire cost advantage to consumers as they absorb part of it in the
markup. As a result, the price ratio of less to more productive rms is smaller
than their cost ratio and thus the quantities sold by less productive rms are too
large from an e¢ ciency point of view relative to those sold by more productive
rms.
Turning to average rm size q, given (2), expressions (6) and (17) together
with expressions (9) and (20) imply
qm =
Z cm
0
qm(c)dGm(c) =
L
2
1
k + 1
cm (22)
qo =
Z co
0
qo(c)dGo(c) =
L

1
k + 1
co = 2
k+1
k+2 qm
so that the cuto¤ ranking co < cm dictates the average output ranking qm < qo.
Accordingly, we can write:
Corollary 4 (Average rm size) In the market equilibrium rms are on
average smaller than optimal.
The intuition behind this corollary follows from the discussion of the previous
one: a lower cuto¤ with markup pricing makes rms on average larger in the
optimum than in the market equilibrium.
Finally, given (11), (18) and (22), the total output of the di¤erentiated
varieties evaluates to Nmqm = (L=) (  cm) and Noqo = (L=) (  co) at
the market equilibrium and at the optimum respectively. Hence, co < cm implies
Noqo > Nmqm and we have:
Corollary 5 (Between-sector misallocation) In the market equilibrium the
total supply of di¤erentiated varieties is smaller than optimal.
4.3 Product variety and entry
The equilibrium is suboptimal also when it comes to the number of varieties
supplied. However, given (11) and (18), the ranking of cuto¤s co < cm does not
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allow to rank Nm and No unambiguously. In particular, since cm = 21=(k+2)co,
we have Nm > No as long as
 > 1  c
o
2
k+1
k+2   1
=
1
2
k+1
k+2   1
"
(k + 1)(k + 2) (cM )
k
f
L
# 1
k+2
(23)
which is the case when  as well as L are large and when , f as well as cM are
small. Hence, we can state the following result:
Corollary 6 (Product variety) Product variety is richer (poorer) in the mar-
ket equilibrium than in the optimum when varieties are close (far) substitutes,
the sunk entry cost is small (large), market size is large (small) and the di¤er-
ence between the highest and the lowest possible cost draws is small (large).
This corollary has an interesting implication for the impact of larger mar-
ket size, driven for example by the integration of previously autarkic national
markets. In this scenario, it could well be that each national market on its own
is small enough to entail  < 1 whereas the internationally integrated market
is large enough to entail  > 1. Then, according to the corollary, market in-
tegration would cause the transition from a situation in which product variety
is ine¢ ciently poor (Nm < No) to a situation in which it becomes ine¢ ciently
rich (Nm > No).
Turning to entry, the equilibrium number of entrants is given by
N jE =
N j
G(cj)
= N j
cM
cj
k
(24)
with j 2 fm; og. Then, together with (11) and (18) as well as (9) and (20),
expression (24) can be used to show that cm = 21=(k+2)co imply NmE > N
o
E as
long as
 > 2  2
2=(k+2)   1
21=(k+2)   1c
o =
22=(k+2)   1
21=(k+2)   1
"
(k + 1)(k + 2) (cM )
k
f
L
# 1
k+2
(25)
which is the case when  as well as L are large and , f as well as cM are small.
This leads to:
Corollary 7 (Entry) More (fewer) rms enter in the market equilibrium than
in the optimum if varieties are close (far) substitutes, the sunk entry cost is
small (large), market size is large (small) and the di¤erence between the highest
and the lowest possible cost draws is small (large).
As larger market size reduces 2, it causes the transition from a situation
in which the resources devoted to develop new varieties are ine¢ ciently small
(NmE < N
o
E) to a situation in which they are ine¢ ciently large (N
m
E > N
o
E).
Given that (23) and (25) imply 1 < 2, corollaries 6 and 7 together imply
that the market provides too little entry with too little variety for  < 1 and
too much entry with too much variety for  > 2. For 1 <  < 2 it provides,
instead, too much variety and too little entry.
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5 The impact of rm heterogeneity
We now turn to the relation between the degree of heterogeneity and the ex-
tent of the market ine¢ ciency. The key question here is whether or not the
ine¢ ciency of the market equilibrium is largest when selection is needed most,
that is, when there are a lot of low productivity rms and few high productivity
ones.
As discussed by Ottaviano (2012), the scale and shape parameters of the
Pareto distribution (2) regulate the heterogeneityof cost draws along two di-
mensions: richnessand evenness(Maignan, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Rullani,
2003). First, the scale parameter cM quanties richness, dened as the mea-
sure (number) of di¤erent unit labor requirements that can be drawn. Larger
cM leads to a rise in heterogeneity along the richness dimension, and this is
achieved by making it possible to draw also larger unit labor requirements than
the original ones. Second, the shape parameter k is an inverse measure of even-
ness, dened as the similarity between the probabilities of those di¤erent draws
to happen. When k = 1, the unit labor requirement distribution is uniform
on [0; cM ] with maximum evenness. As k increases, the unit labor requirement
distribution becomes more concentrated at higher unit labor requirements close
to cM : evenness falls. As k goes to innity, the distribution becomes degener-
ate at cM : all draws deliver a unit labor requirement cM with probability one.
Hence, smaller k leads to a rise in heterogeneity along the evenness dimension,
and this is achieved by making low unit labor requirements more likely with-
out changing the unit labor requirements that are possible. Accordingly, more
richness (larger cM ) comes with higher average unit labor requirement (cost-
increasing richness), more evenness (smaller k) comes with lower average unit
labor requirement (cost-decreasing evenness).
Given the cuto¤ expressions (9) and (20), more heterogeneity has di¤erent
impacts on selection depending on whether it comes through more richness or
evenness. To see this, rewrite (9) and (20) as:
cm
cM
k "
L
4
2 (cm)
2
(k + 2) (k + 1)
#
= f

co
cM
k "
L
2
2 (cm)
2
(k + 2) (k + 1)
#
= f
where (cm=cM )
k and (co=cM )
k are the shares of viable varieties and the brack-
eted terms are average rm prot for the market equilibrium and average sur-
plus per variety for the optimum respectively. For any given cuto¤s, more
cost-increasing richness (larger cM ) decreases the left hand sides of both expres-
sions through its depressing e¤ect on the share of viable varieties. As the right
hand sides are constant, (9) and (20) can keep on holding only if the cuto¤s
rise. Di¤erently, for any given cuto¤s (smaller than cM ), more cost-decreasing
evenness (smaller k) increases the left hand sides of both expressions through
its enhancing e¤ect on both the share of viable varieties and average prot or
surplus. Again, as the right hand sides are constant, (9) and (20) can keep on
holding only if the cuto¤s fall. Hence, while more cost-increasing richness makes
selection softer, more cost-decreasing evenness makes it tougher.
When we focus on the percentage deviation of the market equilibrium from
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the optimum, only the change in evenness matters for several outcomes. Specif-
ically, given cm = 21=(k+2)co, more eveness (smaller k) leads to a larger per-
centage gap in the cuto¤s between the market equilibrium and the optimum
((cm   co) =co rises) whereas more richness is immaterial. Hence, we have:
Proposition 8 (Heterogeneity and selection) More cost-decreasing even-
ness increases the percentage gap in the cuto¤s between the market equilibrium
and the optimum. Cost-increasing richness has no impact on this gap.
As in the case of Proposition 1, Proposition 8 gives rise to a series of parallel
corollaries. First, given o = 21=(k+2) m, smaller k increases the percentage
aggregate productivity gap between the market equilibrium and the optimum
(
 
o   m =o rises). We can therefore state:
Corollary 9 (Heterogeneity and productivity) More cost-decreasing even-
ness increases the percentage gap in the aggregate productivity between the mar-
ket equilibrium and the optimum. Cost-increasing richness has no impact on
this gap.
Second, recall that, with respect to the optimum, the market equilibrium
undersupplies varieties with marginal cost c 2 [0;  2  21=(k+2) co) and over-
supplies varieties with marginal cost c 2 ( 2  21=(k+2) co; cm]. When k falls 
2  21=(k+2) co=cm also falls whereas it does not change when cM changes.
This leads to:
Corollary 10 (Heterogeneity and within-sector misallocation) More cost-
decreasing evenness makes the overprovision of varieties relatively more likely
than its underprovision in the market equilibrium. Cost-increasing richness has
no impact on this.
Third, given that by (22) qo = 2
k+1
k+2 qm, smaller k decreases the percentage
average size gap between the optimum and the market equilibrium ((qo   qm) =qo
falls). Hence, we have:
Corollary 11 (Heterogeneity and average rm size) More cost-decreasing
evenness decreases the percentage gap in average rm size between the market
equilibrium and the optimum. Cost-increasing richness has no impact on this
gap.
Fourth, expressions Nmqm = (L=) (  cm) and Noqo = (L=) (  co)
allow us to write
Noqo  Nmqm
Noqo
=
cm   co
co
co
  co
By Proposition 8 changes in cM have no impact on (cm   co) =co whereas, by
(20), larger cM leads to larger co and therefore larger co= (  co). Accordingly,
larger cM implies larger (Noqo  Nmqm) =Noqo. Proposition 8 also states that
smaller k leads to larger (cm   co) =co whereas, by (20), smaller k leads to smaller
co and therefore smaller co= (  co). As the latter e¤ect is strong when co is far
from  and this is the case for small k, falling k decreases (Noqo  Nmqm) =Noqo
when k is initially small and increases it when k is initially large. We can then
write:
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Corollary 12 (Heterogeneity and between-sector misallocation) More
cost-increasing richness increases the percentage gap in the total output of the
di¤erentiated varieties between the market equilibrium and the optimum. More
cost-decreasing evenness increases the percentage gap if evenness is initially low
and decreases it if evenness is initially high.
Fifth, given again Proposition 8, expressions (11) and (18) with the associ-
ated condition (23) lead to:
Corollary 13 (Heterogeneity and product variety) Less cost-decreasing
evenness and more cost-increasing richness makes the underprovision of variety
relatively more likely than its overprovision in the market equilibrium.
Analogously, given (24) and the associated condition (25), we can write:
Corollary 14 (Heterogeneity and entry) Less cost-decreasing evenness and
more cost-increasing richness makes the lack of entry relatively more likely than
excess entry in the market equilibrium.
In the limit, when k goes to innity, the Pareto distribution convergences to
a Dirac distribution with all density concentrated at cM . In this case without
heterogeneity, in which the number of entrants and the number of producers
coincide, the market always yields too much entry and too much variety with
respect to the optimum (Ottaviano and Thisse, 1999).7
Finally, we can look at the relation between heterogeneity and welfare. The
welfare level attained in the market equilibrium can be expressed as a function
of a corresponding cuto¤ through the following substitutions in the planners
objective (14):expression (11) can be used together with NE = N (cM=cm)
k to
substitute for NE ; expression (8) can be used to substitute for f ; expression (6)
can be used to substitute for q(c). The result is:
Wm = L+ q0L+
L
2
(  cm)

  k + 1
k + 2
cm

(26)
Analogously, the welfare level attained in the optimum can be expressed as a
function of a corresponding cuto¤ through the following substitutions in the
planners objective (14): expression (18) can be used together with NE =
N (cM=c
m)
k to substitute for NE ; expression (19) can be used to substitute
for f ; expression (17) can be used to substitute for q(c). This gives:
W o = L+ q0L+
L
2
(  co)2 (27)
Given cm = 21=(k+2)co, it is readily veried that we have Wm < W o, as to be
expected. Comparing (26) and (27) also reveals:8
Corollary 15 (Heterogeneity and welfare) More cost-decreasing evenness
and less cost-increasing richness reduce the percentage gap in welfare between
the market equilibrium and the optimum.
In other words, from a welfare point of view, the ine¢ ciency of the market
equilibrium is largest when selection is needed most: a lot of low productivity
rms and few high productivity ones.
7See Appendix B.
8See Appendix C for a proof.
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6 Constrained optimum
The unconstrained optimum discussed so far has been traditionally regarded of
little practical relevance from a normative point of view. Its implementation
requires the use of lump-sum instruments to subsidize the entry of rms that
otherwise would not cover their entry costs due to marginal cost pricing at the
unconstrained optimum. As these instruments are considered hardly available
in reality, it is interesting to look at the constrainedoptimum, in which the
di¤erentiated sector has to be nancially self-su¢ cient.
The constrained planner maximizes (14) with respect to NE subject to two
constraints: prot maximizing output (6) and the free entry condition (8).
These impose the planner the market cuto¤ (9). Substituting (6) and (8) in
(14) allows us to rewrite the constrained problem as the maximization of
W = L+ q0L+
2 (k + 2)  (2k + 3) cm
2cm
fNE    (k + 2) (c
m)k
4 (k + 1) (cM )
k
f (NE)
2 (28)
with respect to NE . Then, using NE = N (cM=cm)
k to substitute for NE in the
rst order condition of the planners problem yields
Ns =
2 (k + 1)

  2k+32(k+2)cm
cm
(29)
Comparing this expression with (11) reveals that product variety is richer in the
constrained optimum than in the market equilibrium.
Expression (11) can be used together with NE = N (cM=cm)
k to substitute
for NE while (8) can be used to substitute for f in the planners objective. The
result expresses welfare in the constrained optimum as a function of the market
cuto¤
W s = L+ q0L+
L
2

  2k + 3
2(k + 2)
cm
2
This is smaller than W o but larger than Wm. In particular, we have
W s  Wm = L
8

cm
k + 2
2
Given (9), less cost-increasing richness (smaller cM ) reduces the percentage gap
between the market outcome and the constrained optimum. The same happens
in the case of more cost-decreasing evenness (smaller k) when initial evenness
is high. Di¤erently, when initial evenness is low, more cost-decreasing evenness
raises the gap.9 As in the case of the unconstrained optimum, the ine¢ ciency
of the market equilibrium is largest when selection is needed most.
7 Conclusion
After some decades of relative oblivion, the interest in the optimality properties
of monopolistic competition has recently re-emerged due to the heterogeneous
rms revolutionin international trade theory initiated by Melitz (2003). The
9See Appendix C for a proof.
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availability of an appropriate and parsimonious framework to deal with rm
heterogeneity allows to bring back into the normative debate the full set of
questions the canonical formalization of the Chamberlinian model by Spence
(1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) was designed to answer. In particular, it
provides a useful analytical tool to address the question whether in the market
equilibrium the products are supplied by the right set of rms, or there are
rather errorsin the choice of technique.
We have contributed to this debate by showing that in a model with non-
separable utility, variable demand elasticity and endogenous rm heterogeneity,
the market outcome errs in many ways: with respect to the number of products,
the size and the choice of producers, the overall size of the monopolistically
competitive sector. More crucially with respect to the existing literature, we
have also shown that the extent of the errors depends on the degree of rm
heterogeneity. In particular, we have found that the ine¢ ciency of the market
equilibrium seems to be largest when selection is needed most, that is, when
there are relatively many rms with low productivity and relatively few rms
with high productivity. This holds from the viewpoints of both unconstrained
and constrained e¢ ciency.
These insights have been obtained for a parametrization of demand that
is admittedly specic but still non-separable and more exible than the CES.
It would be important to understand how general they are by checking their
validity under alternative non-separable parametrizations with variable demand
elasticity, such as the one proposed by Behrens and Murata (2007). This is left
to future research.
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8 Appendix A - General distribution
The analysis in the main text is based on the assumption that the distribution
G(c) from which entrants draw their unit labor requirements is a Pareto distri-
bution. In this appendix we show that some key results do not depend on such
assumption.
8.1 Market outcome
Instead of the Pareto distribution, consider a generic G(c) such that dG is
positive in [0; cM ]. The cuto¤ rule is
qm(c) =

L
2 (c
m   c) c  cm =   LQm
0 c > cm
(30)
with Qm  NmE
R cM
0
qm(c)dG(c) = Nm
R cm
0
qm(c)dGm(c), Nm = NmE G(c
m) and
Gm(c) = G(c)=G(cm). The free entry conditionbecomes
1
4
Z cm
0
(cm   c)2 dG(c) = f
L
(31)
In turn, the zero cuto¤ prot conditionbecomes
Nm =
2

  cm
cm   cm (32)
with cm =
hR cm
0
cdGm(c)
i
. The number of entrants is then given by NmE =
Nm=G(cm).
8.2 Unconstrained optimum
The planner maximizes
W = L+ q0L  fNE +NE
R cM
0
(  c) q(c)dG(c)
  12 LNE
R cM
0
[q(c)]
2
dG(c)  12 L

NE
R cM
0
q(c)dG(c)
2 (33)
The two rst order conditions are
@U
@q(c) =
h
NE (  c)  LNEq(c)  L (NE)2
R cM
0
q(c)dG(c)
i
dG(c) = 0 rc
@U
@NE
=  f + R cM
0
(  c) q(c)dG(c)  12 L
R cM
0
[q(c)]
2
dG(c)
  LNE
R cM
0
q(c)dG(c)
2
= 0
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As utility can take only positive values, it must be NoE > 0 at the maximum.
Rearranging the former rst order condition gives
qo(c) =
L

(  c)  

NoE
Z cM
0
qo(c)dG(c) =
L

(  c)  

Qo (34)
with Qo  NoE
R cM
0
qo(c)dG(c) = No
R co
0
qo(c)dGo(c), No = NoEG(c
o) and
Go(c) = G(c)=G(co). Equation (34) and the constraint qo(c)  0 imply that the
same cuto¤ rule for the planner as in the main text:
qo(c) =

L
 (c
o   c) c  co =   LQo
0 c > co
(35)
Integrating (34) across c to obtain Qo, plugging the result in co =  Qo=L
and solving for No gives the planners cuto¤ condition analogous to (32)
No =


  coD
coD   co
(36)
with co =
hR co
0
cdGo(c)
i
and Go(c) = G(c)=G(co). Then, substituting (36) and
(35) in the second rst order condition yields
1
2
Z co
0
(co   c)2 dG(c) = f
L
(37)
8.3 Constrained optimum
When the di¤erentiated sector has to be nancially self-su¢ cient, the con-
strained planner cannot a¤ect the prot maximizing choices of rms in terms
of quantities and prices but it can a¤ect the number of rms that operate in
the economy. Hence, the planner follows the same free entry condition (31) and
thus chooses the same cuto¤ as the market
1
4
Z cm
0
(cm   c)2 dG(c) = f
L
(38)
As to the number of entrants, the planner maximize utility in (33) with respect
to NE subject to the market quantities
qm(c) =

L
2 (c
m   c) c  cm =   LQm
0 c > cm
(39)
The rst order condition of the planners problem is
 f + R cM
0
(  c) qs(c)dG(c)  12 L
R cM
0
[qs(c)]
2
dG(c)  LNsE
R cM
0
qs(c)dG(c)
2
= 0
Substituting (38) and (39) then gives
Ns = Nm +

2
 
1 +
2c
(cm   c)2
!
(40)
where c =
R cm
0
cdGm(c) is the conditional mean and 2c =
R cm
0
(c  c)2dGm(c) is
the conditional variance of the unit labor requirement in the market equilibrium.
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8.4 Firm selection and product variety
Equations (31) and (38) are identical. They have the same right hand side as
(37) and left hand sides that di¤er only up to a positive multiplicative constant
that is larger for the unconstrained planner. Given that
R x
0
(x  c)2 dG(c) is an
increasing function of x, the ranking of the multiplicative constants implies a
reverse ranking of cuto¤s co < cs = cm. This generalizes Proposition 1 in the
text.
Turning to the number of varieties supplied at the di¤erent outcomes, the
cuto¤ conditions (32) and (40) readily establish that the constrained planner
provides richer product variety than the market equilibrium. On the other hand,
(32) and (36) are functions of the cuto¤s that di¤er from one another only up to
a positive multiplicative constant: Nm(x)  N and No(x) = N(x)=2. However,
the sign of the derivative N 0(x) depends on the properties of G(c):
sign (N 0(c)) = sign f  [x  c(x)]  [(  x) (1  c0(x))]g
where c(x) =
R x
0
cdG(c)

=G(x) and c0(x) is its derivative. The sign is ambigu-
ous because for a generic distribution function the derivative c0(x) of the condi-
tional mean based on right truncation can be larger than 1. Hence, N(x) need
not be decreasing everywhere, even if it equals 0 at x =  and diverges to +1
when x goes to 0. We can, nonetheless, state a su¢ cient condition for c0(x) < 1,
and, therefore, for N 0(x) < 0. The condition is that G(c) is log-concave (see
Lemma 1 in Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005).10 As this is only a su¢ cient con-
dition, there exists a larger family of functions than the log-concave ones that
guarantee N 0(x) < 0. This ensures that, within each outcome (whether market
equilibrium or unconstrained optimum), a lower cuto¤ is associated with richer
product variety. It does not allow, however, to unambiguously rank the uncon-
strained planner and the market equilibrium in terms of product variety as in
the Pareto case discussed in the main text.
As a nal comment, it should be noted that no result is, instead, available
concerning the implications of di¤erent degrees of rm heterogeneity for the
e¢ ciency gap of the market equilibrium in the case of a generic G(c) as, di¤er-
ently from the Pareto case, in the generic case the unconditional distribution
generally puts little structure on the conditional (truncated) distribution.
9 Appendix B - Homogeneous rms
For parsimony, let us focus on the unconstrained optimum and the market
equilibrium. The constrained optimum can be analyzed analogously. To connect
to the previous analysis, rewrite (31) and (37) respectively as
1
2
G(co)
n
[co   c(co)]2 + 2c(co)
o
=
f
L
(41)
10Most of the most commonly used distribution functions are log-concave: Uniform, Normal,
Exponential, Logistic, Extreme Value, Laplace (Double Exponential), Power Function, (c 
1), Weibull (c  1), Gamma (c  1), Chi-Squared (c  2), Chi (c  1), Beta (a  1,
e). Note also that Theorem 9 in Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) shows that, if a probability
distribution has a log-concave (log-convex) density function (cumulative distribution function),
then any truncation of this probability distribution will also have a log-concave (log-convex)
density function (cumulative distribution function). Thus, N 0(x) < 0 under all commonly
used distributions.
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and
1
4
G(cm)
n
[cm   c(cm)]2 + 2c(cm)
o
=
f
L
(42)
where we have used the following expression for the conditional variance of the
marginal cost distribution 2c(x) =
R x
0
c2dG(c)

=G(x) c(x)2. Without hetero-
geneity, there is no variance in costs (2c = 0), all entrants produce (G(c
m) = 1),
and c is exogenous and common to all rms with c = c.
Given (41), the rst best planners solution for the cuto¤ is
co = c+
r
2f
L
(43)
This determines the willingness to pay of consumers for any variety. As co > c,
all entrants produce. How much they produce can be determined by noticing
that expression (35) implies qo(c) = (L=) (co   c) so that we can rewrite (43)
to obtain rm output as
qo =
s
2fL

(44)
Then, by using (36) and (43), we nd that the number of varieties supplied is
No =
(  c)
q
L
2f   

(45)
Turning to the market equilibrium, expression (42) implies that, with no
heterogeneity, the cuto¤ evaluates to
cm = c+ 2
r
f
L
(46)
Again, the willingness to pay cm is larger than the common marginal cost c, so all
entrants produce. Furthermore, expression (30) implies qm(c) = (L=2) (cm   c),
which can be used together with (46) to nd rm output
qm =
s
fL

(47)
Furthermore, (32) and (46) imply that the number of rms producing in the
market economy is
Nm =
(  c)
q
L
f   2

(48)
It is readily veried from (44) and (47) that we always have qo > qm. More-
over, from (45) and (48), we we also have Nm > No if and only if
 > c+
p
2p
2  1
r
f
L
(49)
which shows that each rm is smaller in the market equilibrium than in the
unconstrained optimum, and the market tends to overprovide variety when va-
rieties are close substitutes ( small) and when the xed cost f is low compared
to market size as measured by  and L. These results concur with those in
Ottaviano and Thisse (1999), taking into account that they assume L = 1.
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10 Appendix C - Heterogeneity and ine¢ ciency
10.1 Equilibrium vs. optimum
Given cm = 21=(k+2)co as well as (27) and (26), the percentage gap in welfare
between the optimum and the market equilibrium can be written as
W o  Wm
W o
=
acm
1 + q0 +
h
    121=(k+2) cmi2
where a  b dcm, b  (2k+3)= (k + 2) 2 (k+3)=(k+2) and d  (k + 1) = (k + 2) 
2 2=(k+2). Given that =cm > 1 > d=b, it is readily veried that a > 0 and,
consequently, W o > Wm as to be expected. Derivation with respect to cM then
implies
@
 
W o Wm
W o

@cM
=
W o (b  2dcm) +   121=(k+2) 2acm (  co)
(W o)2
@cm
@cM
which is positive given that: @cm=@cM > 0; W o > 0; (  co) > 0; a > 0 and
b   2dcm > 0 as =cm > 1 > 2d=b holds. The signs of these expressions,
together with
@cm=@k = cm
n
ln (cM=c
m) = (k + 2) + (2k + 3) =
h
(k + 2)
2
(k + 1)
io
> 0
as cM > cm, and

@b
@k
  cm @d
@k
> 0
as =cm > 1 > 2
 
2 2=(k+2) ln 2  2 1 = 2 (k+3)=(k+2) ln 2  1, also ensure
that
@
 
W o Wm
W o

@k
=
W o[( @b@k cm @d@k )cm+(b 2dcm) @c
m
@k ]+2ac
m( co)
24( 12 )1=(k+2) @cm@k + ( 12 )
1
k+2
+2
ln 2
( 12 k+1)
2 c
m
35
(W o)2
is positive.
10.2 Equilibrium vs. constrained optimum
The percentage gap in welfare between the constrained optimum and the market
equilibrium is given by
W s  Wm
W s
=
1
8

cm
k+2
2
1 + q0 +
1
2

  2k+32(k+2)cm
2
and it is readily veried that
@
 
W s Wm
W s

@cM
=
W s + (2k+3)c
m
4(k+2)
h
  2k+32(k+2)cm
i
4 (k + 2)
2
(W s)
2 c
m @c
m
@cM
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is positive as W s > 0, @cm=@cM > 0 and   (2k + 3) = [2(k + 2)] cm > 0, which
is required to have Ns > 0.
Derivation with respect to k then yields
@
 
W s Wm
W s

@k
=
(cm)
2
n
(k + 1) ln
h
(cM )
2L
2(k+1)(k+2)f
i
   k + k2   1o
4 (k + 1) (k + 2)
4
W s
which is positive (negative) for k < k (k > k) when ln
h
(cM )
2
L= (12f)
i
>
1=2, where k > 1 is the value of k that solves:11
ln
n
(cM )
2
L= [2(k + 1)(k + 2)f ]
o
=
 
k   1 + k2 = (k + 1)
Otherwise, when
ln
h
(cM )
2
L= (12f)
i
< 1=2; @ [(W s  Wm) =W s] =@k < 0
holds.
11The term (cM )
2 L= [2(k + 1)(k + 2)f ] is larger than 1 to ensure cm < cM . Then the
left hand side of the equation, ln
n
(cM )
2 L= [2(k + 1)(k + 2)f ]
o
, is a positive and decreasing
function of k. The right hand side,
 
k   1 + k2 = (k + 1), is instead a positive and increasing
function of k, attaining value 1=2 at k = 1. Hence, the two functions cross only once at
k = k > 1 if ln
h
(cM )
2 L= (12f)
i
> 1=2.
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